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This paper surveys the contributions of economists since the 1960s to our 
understanding of Australia’s evolving production and trade pattern and to the policies 
affecting it. Changes in comparative advantage only partly explain the trade pattern. 
Much of the residual explanation has to do with Federal Government policies and 
their reform since the early 1970s. Attention here focuses on manufacturing tariffs 
and other trade policies, and on trade-related sectoral/industry assistance policies. 
The recent policy reforms have not been unrelated to developments in the 
multilateral trading system (and, as part of that, in the Asia Pacific Economic Forum), 
so contributions by Australian economists to those developments are also briefly 
reviewed. The survey concludes by reflecting on the influence economists have had 
in shaping Australia’s trade and trade-related policy reforms since the 1960s. 
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 Introduction 
  When the Australian Federation formed in 1901, trade policy was a major 
point of difference between the colonies that were to become states within that 
federation. It turned out that the protectionists dominated the free traders, and before 
World War I Australia had adopted a firm protectionist stance. For seven decades 
thereafter, tariffs on imports of manufactures continued to rise. The average tariff 
level on non-food manufactures almost doubled in the decade to 1920, and doubled 
again by 1932. It dropped only a little in the latter 1930s, and then rose again after 
World War II. Protection was further increased in the 1940s and 1950s with the 
adoption of quantitative import restrictions, and there was a ban on exports of iron ore 
and coal. Unlike most other industrial countries, Australia did not take part in the 
multilateral tariff reductions negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) during the 1950s and 1960s. Hence by 1970 Australia was rivalled 
only by New Zealand in having the highest manufacturing tariffs among the industrial 
countries (Anderson and Garnaut 1987). 
That seven decades of import-substituting industrialization cost Australia 
dearly in terms of its comparative standard of living. In 1900, Australia was arguably 
the highest-income country in the world on a per capita basis. But by 1950 its rank 
had slipped to third; by 1970 it was eighth; and by the 1990s Australia was not even 
in the top twenty.
1  
Australia’s comparatively poor growth performance for most of the twentieth 
century contrasts with that of the final decade, when Australia out-performed all other 
advanced economies other than Ireland and Norway in terms of GDP per capita 
growth (World Bank 2000b, Tables 1, 3 and 11). This was a period of especially rapid 
productivity growth (Parham et al. 1999; Dowrick 2001), in contrast to Britain where 
much of its catch-up has been due to growth in employment and hours worked per 
worker (Card and Freeman 2002). 
The difference between the economy’s recent and earlier relative 
performances is due very substantially to the economic policy reforms of the past 
three decades. The belated opening of the Australian economy to the rest of the world, 
coupled with many domestic economic reforms, not only has arrested the decline in 
Australia’s per capita income ranking. It also has had a remarkable influence on the 
pattern of Australia’s production and trade.  2
 
This chapter surveys the contributions of economists since the 1960s to our 
understanding of Australia’s evolving trade pattern, and to the policies affecting it. 
Changes in comparative advantage partly explain the trade pattern, but much of the 
residual explanation has to do with the reform of interventionist policies that started in 
the early 1970s and accelerated in the mid-1980s. Attention here focuses on 
manufacturing tariffs and other trade policies, and on trade-related sectoral/industry 
assistance policies. The recent policy reforms have not been unrelated to 
developments in the multilateral trading system (and, as part of that, in the Asia 
Pacific Economic Forum), so contributions by Australian economists to those 
developments are also briefly reviewed. The survey concludes by reflecting on the 
influence economists have had in shaping Australia’s trade and trade-related policy 
reforms since the 1960s. 
Attention is mainly confined to literature from the past quarter-century.
2 The 
focus is on open economy microeconomics applied to understanding Australian trade 
and the influences on it of trade policies and trade-related sectoral/industry policies. 
Space constraints exclude contributions to pure trade theory and to open economy 
macroeconomics (including exchange rates and balance of payments), and foreign 
investment is treated only briefly. 
 
Australia’s evolving trade pattern  
For the natural resource-rich, lightly populated Australian economy, the most 
appropriate theory of comparative advantage is a blend of the two core models 
developed in the 20
th century: the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model which assumes 
all factors of production are mobile between sectors, and the Ricardo-Viner model 
which assumes some factors are sector-specific. Such a blend is provided by Krueger 
(1977) and explored further by Deardorff (1984). They consider two tradable sectors 
each using intersectorally mobile labour plus one sector-specific factor (natural-
resource capital or industrial capital). Assuming that labour exhibits diminishing 
marginal product in each sector, and that there are no services or nontradables and no 
policy distortions, then at a given set of international prices the real wage is 
determined by the aggregate per worker endowment of natural-resource and industrial 
capital. The commodity composition of a country's trade -- that is, the extent to which 
a country is a net exporter of primary or industrial products -- is determined by its 3
 
endowment of natural relative to industrial capital compared with that ratio for the 
rest of the world.  
Leamer (1987) develops this model further and relates it to paths of economic 
development. If the stock of natural resources is unchanged, rapid growth by one or 
more economies relative to others in their availability of industrial capital per worker 
would cause those economies to strengthen their comparative advantage in non-
primary products. On the other hand, a discovery of minerals or energy raw materials 
would strengthen that country’s comparative advantage in mining and weaken its 
comparative advantage in farm and other goods, ceteris paribus. It would also boost 
national income and hence the demand for nontradables, which would cause mobile 
resources to move into the production of nontradables, further reducing farm and 
industrial production (Corden 1984).
3  
Domestic or foreign savings can be invested to enhance the stock and/or 
improve the quality not only of industrial capital but also of labour or natural 
resources, and to providing capital to the nontradables sector. Any such increase in 
the net stock of produced capital per worker will put upward pressure on real wages. 
That will encourage, in all sectors, the use of more labour-saving techniques and the 
development and/or importation of new technologies that are less labour intensive. 
Which types of capital would expand fastest in a free-market setting depends 
on their expected rates of return. The more densely populated, natural resource-poor a 
country, the greater the likelihood that the highest payoff would be in expanding its 
capital stocks for non-primary sectors. At early stages of development of such a 
country with a relatively small stock of natural resources per worker, wages would be 
low and the country would have a comparative cost advantage in unskilled labour-
intensive, standard-technology manufactures. Then as the stock of industrial capital 
grows, there would be a gradual move toward exporting more capital- and skill-
intensive manufactures. Natural resource-abundant economies such as Australia, 
however, would develop a comparative advantage in manufacturing at a late stage of 
development, and their industrial exports would be relatively capital intensive. 
The above theory of changing comparative advantages has been used 
successfully to explain the evolving pattern of exports of Australia and its Asian 
trading partners (Anderson and Garnaut 1980, 1987; Anderson and Smith 1981; 
Anderson 1995). It can also be used to explain shocks to that evolutionary pattern, as 4
 
with mining booms.
4 But the evolving pattern of a country’s production and trade 
specialization also depends on policy choices and their changes over time. 
In Australia’s case, its long history of industrial protectionism, together with 
its ban on iron ore and coal exports until the early 1960s, ensured a smaller share of 
Australia’s GDP was traded than would be normal for an economy of its size 
(Anderson and Garnaut 1987, pp.14-15). It also ensured a bigger manufacturing sector 
than would have emerged under free trade, which was possible in a full-employment 
setting only at the expense of other sectors. The sector’s share of GDP by 1960 was 
the same as the OECD average (29 per cent), even though Australia has always been 
lightly populated and so has a weak comparative advantage in manufactures. The 
removal of the ban on key mineral raw materials in the early 1960s and the tariff 
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s corrected that though: between 1960 and 1990 
manufacturing’s share of GDP fell much more rapidly for Australia than for the 
average OECD country (to 15 per cent compared with the OECD average of 22 per 
cent -- Anderson 1995, p. 49). 
The excessive size of the manufacturing sector was particularly at the expense 
of the natural resource-based sectors in which Australia had its strongest comparative 
advantage. We have known since Lerner (1936) that an import tax is equivalent to an 
export tax, but how it affects the sector producing nontradables depends heavily on 
the elasticities of substitution in production and consumption as between tradables 
and nontradables. Sjaastad and Clements (1982) suggest that in Australia nontradables 
were relatively close substitutes for importables, and so their production would have 
been encouraged by protection of import-competing industries, further drawing 
mobile factors of production away from export industries. 
It was not only natural resource-based exportables that Australia’s 
protectionism discouraged, however. Also discouraged were export industries within 
the manufacturing sector, as well as services exports. Together those two sectors 
contributed only one-twelth of Australia’s exports in the early 1950s. Even by 1980 
their contribution was barely above one-quarter, but by 1990 it had risen to one-third 
and by 2000 to 44 per cent or 22 per cent each (thus each surpassing the 21 per cent 
share for agriculture for the first time -- Anderson 2001, Table 2).  
These impacts of Australia’s protectionism on the composition of its 
production and trade, and on the share of production traded internationally, were 
made ever-clearer by economy-wide, computable general equilibrium (CGE) 5
 
modellers. The first economy-wide models began appearing in the early 1970s, in 
Australia’s case thanks to Evans (1972), and by the early 1980s they were being used 
routinely for policy analysis in Australia as elsewhere.  
Building on Evans work, a group of Melbourne-based economists led the 
world in developing for Australia a very detailed CGE model for practical policy 
analysis. Known as ORANI (Dixon et al. 1982), that model was used to estimate 
impacts on sectoral production, employment and trade, and on economic welfare, of a 
wide range of policies. Those results had a major impact on policy debate in Australia 
during the acceleration of microeconomic reform in the 1980s (Powell and Snape 
1993).  
Since the 1980s CGE models have become even more sophisticated, and in 
particular have added regional, occupational and household disaggregations and have 
become dynamic. Australia has again been at the frontier of those developments, as 
manifested in the transforming of the Australian ORANI model into the MONASH 
model (Dixon and Rimmer 1998). The dynamic feature of MONASH has been 
particularly important because it allows forecasting though time and hence can show 
paths of adjustment to shocks (Dixon, Menon and Rimmer 2000). But the 
disaggregation of results by region and occupation within Australia has also been 
important in two respects. One is that it makes it easier to identify which household 
groups might lose from a structural or policy change, thereby making it easier to fine-
tune any safety nets in advance; the other is that it identifies more precisely which 
groups are likely to gain, and so makes it easier for government to point to and seek 
support from the beneficiaries of policy reform. 
While the national CGE models have been able to show the effects of 
structural or policy changes on the composition of Australia’s trade, they have not 
been designed to estimate the effect on the bilateral pattern of that trade. For that a 
multi-country global CGE model is needed, together with an appropriate theory of 
bilateral trade. Early contributions to bilateral trade theory included ANU theses by 
Peter Drysdale, who focused on the growth of the Australia-Japan trading 
relationship, and Ross Garnaut, who applied them to Australia’s trade with Southeast 
Asia. They stressed the importance not only of relative distance between countries but 
also of similarities in such things as culture, business practices and legal systems. The 
theory and measurement ideas are brought together in Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), 
where the index of intensity of a trading relationship is defined as the product of an 6
 
index of trade complementary (how closely the product composition of country A’s 
exports matches that of country B’s imports) and an index of special country bias 
(which captures all other factors). Those indexes have since been measured for all 
bilateral trades among Pacific rim countries and used in public policy discussions 
about the growth in Australia’s trade with Asia, most notably following the 
publication of a popular report prepared for the government by Garnaut (1989).  
Global CGE models were slower in coming because they require so much 
more data than national models. Early examples from North America are Whalley 
(1985) and Deardorff and Stern (1986, 1990). In Australia they first emerged as the 
SALTER model, developed by what was the Industry (and now is the Productivity) 
Commission in association with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Jomini 
et al. 1991). Part of the government’s motivation was to model bilateral trade in the 
Asia-Pacific region, in the wake of the Hawke Government’s push to launch of the 
Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) in 1989.  
A copy of the SALTER model was taken to Purdue University and, since the 
early 1990s, it has been improving constantly and been made publicly available as the 
so-called GTAP model and database (Global Trade Analysis Project – see Hertel 
1997). The extraordinary efforts by Tom Hertel to train users and recruit willing 
helpers to revise and update the production, trade and protection data, to improve the 
theory in the model, and to encourage econometric estimation of the elasticities 
embodied in it, has resulted in hundreds of people becoming users and thousands of 
simulation experiments being published since its creation (see 
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). That openness, which has been characteristic of some 
other CGE modelling groups including ORANI and MONASH, has been a great spur 
to modelling innovations. 
The basic global GTAP model is similar in architecture to the Australian 
ORANI model, but more complex versions are being developed all the time. Among 
the modifications that have been incorporated for particular applications are scale 
economies and imperfect competition (Francois 1998) and dynamics through capital 
accumulation (Francois and McDonald 1996). In addition, computational tools for 
practical policy analysis have been developed to enable systematic sensitivity analysis 
(Pearson and Arndt 2000) and the decomposition of economic welfare results (Huff 
and Hertel 2001). Trade and related policy analysis is now possible for any of the 66 
countries or country groups in Version 5 of the GTAP model and any of its 57 sectors 7
 
of production (20 agricultural and processed food sectors, 22 other manufacturing 
sectors, and 15 services sectors). Since Armington (1969) elasticities are included (in 
part as a proxy for the special country bias concept that was highlighted by Drysdale 
and Garnaut), products can be differentiated by country of origin. This allows bilateral 
as well as total trade effects to be better explored.  
The increasing importance of services trade and investment and related policy 
issues in the WTO and regional trade negotiations has placed further demands on 
modellers. In response, the Productivity Commission has incorporated foreign direct 
investment in a version of the GTAP model with imperfect competition and scale 
economies, to create what has been named the FTAP model (Dee, Hanslow and 
Phamduc 2000).  
GTAP is of course not the only such CGE model, but it is certainly the most 
widely used. Others were also used in the ex post analysis of the Uruguay Round (see 
the various chapters in Martin and Winters 1996).  Another popular family of models 
arose from expanding a global macro model by adding some sectoral detail 
(McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1995). While having far fewer sectors and regions than 
GTAP, and while relying heavily on the GTAP database, the subsequent McKibbin 
family of models includes capital markets and is dynamic and so was able to generate 
paths of adjustment to simulated shocks earlier than other models. As in dynamic 
national CGE models such as MONASH, the latter feature has obvious appeal to 
policymakers concerned with the short to medium term effects of reform on their 
constituents.  These models are now being used for ex ante analyses of the current 
WTO round of trade negotiations and the numerous bilateral and regional free-trade-
area proposals that have become fashionable again in recent years.
5  
 
Reform of Australia’s industrial tariff protection 
Disenchantment in Australia with its interventionist trade policies gradually 
increased over the 1960s, not least because of the writings of academic economists 
and especially Max Corden. Drawing on a paper on Canada’s protection by Barber 
(1955), Corden (1963) developed and applied to Australia the concept of the effective 
rate of protection (ERP). The distinction between nominal and effective protection is 
that the former measures the extent to which the tariff raises the domestic price of a 
producer’s output whereas the latter indicates the extent to which the producer’s value 
added per unit of output is enhanced, taking into account any tariffs on importable 8
 
intermediate inputs and the share of the industry’s value added in the value of final 
output.  
The ERP concept gained immediate recognition as a practical way of 
indicating more appropriately the level of industry protection against import 
competition not only in aggregate for a country but also – and more importantly -- 
between industries within a country. Its first official use was by the Australia 
Government with the publication of the Vernon Committee Report (Vernon et al. 
1965), to which Corden contributed. The next few years saw an avalanche of both 
theoretical and empirical ERP papers and reports. In his first seminal book, Corden 
(1971) brings together most of the key theoretical ideas, while his survey of empirical 
studies (Corden 1975) covers the first decade of quantitative applications of the 
concept. The early empirical work includes numerous comparative studies of both 
industrial countries (Balassa et al. 1967) and developing countries (Little, Scitovsky 
and Scott 1970; Balassa et al. 1971), a testament to its widespread popularity. A 
striking feature of this literature is the genuine interaction between theory and 
empirical work, and between academic researchers and the policy community 
including the GATT.
6 
These studies reveal many things, but three points in particular are worth 
mentioning here. First, the estimated ERP averages and their dispersion far exceed 
those of nominal rates of protection (NRPs), suggesting that the resource pulls and 
hence costs of protection are much greater than the NRPs on their own might suggest. 
Second, the differences between NRPs and ERPs are not constant across countries, so 
that ERPs are to be preferred to NRPs for cross-country comparisons of the extent of 
protection. And third, while the NRP and ERP rankings of industries within countries 
are not greatly different when the degree of aggregation is fairly high, the rank 
correlation falls as the degree of disaggregation increases. This means ERPs are also 
better than NRPs for across-industry comparisons within a country, since the 
resource-pull cost of protection tends to increase with the range of ERPs, particularly 
within sub-sectors where substitution in production is high.  
Since its first adoption in Australia, the EPR concept has been broadened to 
the effective rate of assistance (ERA) to industries, so as to capture in principle all 
forms of governmental assistance to producers.
7 This is helpful not only for those 
concerned with national resource allocation but also for trade negotiators, given the 9
 
increasing tendency of negotiators to focus also on trade-related measures inside 
national borders as border protection falls. 
The work of academics such as Corden, of the Tariff Board and its successor 
institutions (the Industries Assistance Commission, the Industry Commission and now 
the Productivity Commission),
8 and of the maverick farmer and Federal Politician 
C.R. (Bert) Kelly via his weekly column syndicated to rural newspapers and the 
national financial newspaper on why primary producers were being effectively (albeit 
indirectly) taxed by manufacturing tariffs (see Kelly 1978), gradually changed the 
climate of opinion of economics/business journalists towards one of advocating trade 
liberalization.  
Even so, it was not until the 1970s that major tariff reductions began. A 25 per 
cent across-the-board cut in 1973, preceded by some cuts in 1970-71, started the tariff 
reform process, following an initially confidential report to the government by six 
economic advisors on possible ways to expand imports as a means of reducing 
inflationary pressures (Rattigan et al. 1973). The reform process accelerated in the 
1980s and continued through the 1990s. As a result, the average effective rate of 
assistance to Australian manufacturing fell from 36 per cent to about 5 per cent over 
those three decades. In the 1990s alone, both the mean and the standard deviation of 
Australia's import tariffs on goods halved. This brought the average tariff for 
manufactures down to 4.2 per cent in 1999.
9 The only manufacturers with significant 
tariff protection at the start of the new millennium were motor vehicles and parts, and 
textiles, clothing and footwear. Excluding them, the average effective rare of 




Reductions in assistance to/taxation of other sectors 
Agricultural subsidies and regulatory interventions also have been reduced. 
During the 1960s the standard arguments for agricultural support programs in 
Australia were being shown to lack merit (see the survey by Edwards and Watson 
1978, and the update by Edwards 1992). Following a rural policy report to the new 
Whitlam Labor Government by four economists (Harris et al. 1974), there was some 
debate about the virtues on second-best grounds of farm subsidies as compensation to 
farmers to offset the resource-pull effects of the tariff on manufactures (Harris 1975; 
Lloyd 1975). However, after that debate which included two persuasive analytical 10
 
papers by Warr (1978, 1979), most agricultural and other economists advocated the 
first-best option of lowering tariffs in preference to tariff compensation. Then an 
incisive study by Sieper (1982) on who really was gaining from farm policies made it 
even more difficult for anyone to advocate the retention of agricultural 
regulatory/support policies. By that time even the peak farm bodies were instead 
behind the idea that their best strategy was to support the so-called ‘economic 
rationalist’ line of manufacturing trade liberalization, even if it meant giving up some 
direct farm support measures. 
 As a consequence, the average effective rate of assistance to the farm sector 
fell from above 25 per cent in the early 1970s to well below 10 per cent today. 
Dairying was the only farm group still benefiting significantly from government 
programs in 2000.
11 When dairying is excluded, the estimated effective rate of 
assistance to Australian agriculture in 1998-99 falls from 8 to 3 per cent (Productivity 
Commission 2000c, p. 27). Thus distortionary government assistance to both 
manufacturing and agriculture has now all but disappeared. 
The mining sector has been mostly taxed rather than supported by the 
government. The lifting of the export ban on iron ore and coal in the early 1960s 
allowed the inevitable minerals trade with Japan to get under way. But it was some 
time before the application of more-efficient instruments such as resource rent taxes 
(as advocated by Garnaut and Clunies Ross 1975, 1979, 1983 and scrutinized by 
Emerson and Lloyd 1983). There have been some further reforms since then (Smith 
1992), but the sector remains somewhat discriminated against relative to agriculture 
and manufacturing. 
Service sector interventions also have begun to be dismantled, beginning with 
the Hawke Labor Government following its election in 1983. Markets for banking, 
post and telecommunications, ports, higher education, health, and rail, air, and to 
some extent sea transport have been opened up; there has been progressive out-
sourcing of many government services; and substantial reforms to competition policy 
and practice, including the corporatization and de-monopolization of numerous 
government enterprises, are well advanced.
12 In addition, a comprehensive program of 
review of government regulations at all levels has been under way since the mid-
1990s, with the aim of reducing/removing regulations that unjustifiably impede 
economic activities (Productivity Commission 2000b). 11
 
Moreover, by 1983 the Australian dollar was floating and foreign investment 
flows began to be freed up. That has complemented financial sector reform and has 
contributed to foreign direct investment, equity and foreign currency transactions 
growing at more than three times the pace of Australia’s GDP during the past 15 years 
(see Shields 2001). And even the previously highly unionised labour market has 
undergone considerable reform (Wooden 2001), which with higher education reforms 
has encouraged growth in human capital (Chapman and Withers 2001).  
The freeing of the market for foreign exchange, together with domestic 
microeconomic reforms, has increased competitiveness in the Australian economy 
substantially. That, together with the greater scope it has provided to specialize in 
production so as to reap economies of scale, has added considerable dynamism to the 
Australian economy. It was especially important in contributing to the flexibility with 
which the Australian economy was able to respond to the East Asian financial crisis in 
the late 1990s. Despite Australia's much greater trade exposure to East Asia than most 
other OECD countries, and the consequent decline in its terms of trade, the Australian 
economy weathered that crisis remarkably well, in part through temporarily re-
directing its trade back to Europe and North America. 
 
Costs of trade-distorting policies 
  Australian economists have contributed significantly to understanding and 
measuring the costs of trade-distorting policies. In a seminal paper Corden (1957) 
critiqued the Brigden et al. (1927) report’s approach and in so doing provided both 
partial and general equilibrium ways to consider those costs. The partial approach was 
and continues to be widely used, while large-scale computable general equilibrium 
modelling of those costs had to wait until computing power became affordable. The 
first such effort for Australia, by Evans (1972), was refined by Dixon and Butlin 
(1977) and Dixon (1978) as the ORANI model was being developed (Dixon et al. 
1982). It has since been finessed even further thanks to the development of the 
MONASH model (Dixon and Rimmer 1998). Nonetheless, measurement of the costs 
of protection (or the net benefits of trade reform) remains controversial, with most 
economists confident that those benefits are several orders of magnitude larger than 
existing empirical models suggest, not least because the dynamic effects of reform on 
investment incentives are poorly understood and therefore poorly modelled.  12
 
Meanwhile, the standard arguments for industrial protection in Australia and 
elsewhere have come under close scrutiny, and found wanting. Corden (1974, revised 
1997) examines all the major arguments that have been put forward over the decades 
as to why particular trade policy measures are needed. In virtually all cases, he shows 
there is a more efficient way to achieve society’s goals. Tariffs might have a 
legitimate role at some point in a small economy’s history only where other means of 
either raising government revenue or of redistributing taxes are more expensive in 
terms of administrative or by-product distortion costs.
13 That suggests, just as Sieper 
(1982) found with Australia’s agricultural policies, that the real motive behind 
manufacturing protection policies has more to do with who gains and who loses, and 
that the net welfare loss from intervention is but a minor part of the political economy 
of such policy setting. 
  
Distributional effects of trade-distorting policies 
The Australian debate about who gains or loses from protection stems back to 
Federation, but it was enlivened for economists by the publication of the Brigden 
Committee report in 1929. That led to students and their professors focusing on the 
issue, an important consequence of which was a theoretical publication by Stolper and 
Samuelson (1941). They modelled a small economy and, by assuming there were two 
sectors producing tradables and just two mobile factors of production, they were able 
to conclude that a tariff on imports would raise the real income of the owner of the 
factor used relatively intensely in the import-competing sector and lower the real 
income of the owner of the other factor. In the Australian setting that suggested 
labourers would gain at the expense of capitalists (which in their model included 
landowners).  
No allowance was made in the Stolper-Samuelson model for the facts that 
labourers are heterogeneous and that workers can raise their skills over time (Lloyd 
1978). Perhaps even more importantly, the reality that natural resources such as farm 
land and mineral deposits are specific to the primary sectors was not taken into 
account. A Ricardo-Viner model popularised by Jones (1971) was thus more 
appropriate for Australia, given the importance of the primary sectors. That model 
still involves just two tradable sectors but each is assumed to have one factor of 
production that is specific to its sector, in addition to a perfectly mobile factor 
(labour). With those assumptions Jones predicts that a tariff on imports will raise the 13
 
real income of the owners of the factor that is specific to the import-competing 
manufacturing sector, and lower the real income of the owners of the farmland or 
minerals that are specific to the primary export sector. Moreover, he shows that the 
real incomes of wage earners could go up or down, with the latter more likely the 
larger the share of manufactures in their consumption bundle (since the price of 
manufactured goods is raised by the tariff).  
That set of conclusions is dramatically different from the perception many 
people had based on the Stolper-Samuelson model and the earlier debate in Australia. 
If labour were in fact not to be gaining from tariffs, and that instead the gains were 
being captured only by industrial capitalists (many of them foreigners, since the tariff 
encouraged foreign direct investment in Australia), then any residual credibility in the 
traditional income distributional argument for tariffs collapses (Anderson and Garnaut 
1987, Ch. 5). 
 
Australia and the multilateral trading system 
 Prior to the mid-1980s, Australia was not very engaged in trade agreements 
with other countries except Britain, and even the British connection diminished 
following the UK’s accession (with Ireland and Denmark) to the European 
Community in 1973. Australia was disappointed that earlier multilateral trade 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) failed to 
address the growth and spread of agricultural protectionism.
14 When that 
protectionism reached the point in the early 1980s of generating surpluses of farm 
products that Europe could dispose of only with the help of export subsidies, the 
United States responded in kind. That export subsidy war drove real international 
food prices down to record lows. Australia decided to respond through forming the 
Cairns Group of non-subsidizing agricultural exporting countries in 1986, the key aim 
of which was to keep agriculture on the agenda of the just-launched Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations (Higgott and Cooper 1990). While the implementation of the 
Uruguay Round's Agreement on Agriculture itself has not yet lowered agricultural 
distortions greatly, it has at least placed agriculture in the GATT mainstream ready for 
further cuts in farm protection in the World Trade Organization’s next round of 
multilateral trade negotiations which began in 2000.  
With the greater engagement of Australia in the multilateral trading system 
(MTS) since the early 1980s, Australian economists (not to mention trade officials) 14
 
have become considerably more active in contributing more to the analysis of MTS 
issues of concern to their country. One example is in the design of modalities for 
services trade negotiations (Sampson and Snape 1985; Snape 1998). Others are in 
thinking about how the GATT/WTO should deal with subsidies (Snape 1991), and 
with the growth in regional/preferential trading arrangements.
15 
An especially important contribution to the place of regional arrangements in 
the multilateral trading system has been APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum (Drysdale and Garnaut 1989, Garnaut 1996). A creation launched 
by the Hawke government in 1989, it differs from other regional trade arrangements 
in two key respects. First, it advocates GATT/WTO-consistent open regionalism as 
distinct from adopting a preferential tariff structure that discriminates against non-
members. And second, it provides a useful testing ground for new issues that the 
global trading system is likely to have to grapple with in the WTO in due course. In 
both respects APEC provides more of a stepping stone to freer global trade than so-
called free trade areas or customs unions. 
 
Have economists made a difference? 
Cynics say that economists are unpersuasive because we have known about 
benefits of laissez faire and in particular the gains from trade for more than two 
centuries and yet trade restrictions remain in Australia as elsewhere. Economics 
advocates, on the other hand, will point to and claim some credit for the remarkable 
extent of trade and domestic market reforms that have occurred in recent decades. The 
relevant question is: how much credit can be claimed by economists? There is no way 
of answering this precisely, but a few points are worth making.  
First, revealing the fact that Australia and New Zealand had the most protected 
manufacturers among the OECD countries until the 1980s – and noting that they were 
the slowest-growing of the OECD economies in the post-war period -- was helpful in 
bringing down their protection levels during the past two decades.  
Second, revealing the vast across-industry differences within sectors of 
protection rates, which were much bigger than the differences in nominal rates, helped 
governments to resist domestic pressures to maintain or raise protection for the most 
assisted groups. 
Third, the clarification of the theory and the empirical estimates of the 
consumer and net welfare costs of protection have made it easier for advocates of 15
 
reform to gain headlines than when relying on only abstract arguments about the gains 
from trade, while estimates of the cost of protection to less-assisted export industries 
(and to exporters abroad) have helped build coalitions for trade liberalization. 
Fourth, revealing the extent of effective protection to agriculture relative to 
manufacturing in key OECD countries, and of the industrial sector relative to primary 
sectors in many developing countries (as in Australia), helped to alter the domestic 
political economy forces in both sets of countries. The large increase in the 
farmer/manufacturer assistance gap in OECD countries between the end of the 
GATT’s Tokyo Round and the start of its Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations also helped to ensure agricultural protectionism was placed and remained 
high on the agenda of the Uruguay Round and its creation, the WTO. 
However, the policy ideas and analyses contributed by economists are only a 
small subset of the influences on governments to reform Australia’s trade and industry 
policies over the past three or four decades. Brennan and Pincus (2002) argue that 
Australia governments have simply been reacting to developments in the global 
economy more than exogenously shaping Australia’s economic climate. Certainly 
Australian liberalization in many ways has just followed (with a delay) the market 
reforms of other countries (Garnaut 1994, Corden 1995) but, given the relatively 
entrenched protectionist sentiment, economists probably had to work harder here than 
abroad to alter the climate of opinion in a liberal direction. 
One final point. The influence of academic economists on Australian 
economic policies has gradually become more indirect rather than direct. In earlier 
decades there were very few economists working full time in government, so 
dependence on academics for policy advice was quite common. Since the 1960s, 
however, there has been a boom in employment opportunities for economists in 
federal government agencies. As a result, much of the required policy analysis is done 
in such agencies as the Productivity Commission and the Australia Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, or in economic consulting companies staffed 
by former senior public servants, leaving academics freer to concentrate on research 
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1 In 1999 Australia was ranked twenty-sixth, according to the World Bank Atlas method of measuring 
GNP per capita (or twentieth using the World Bank’s Purchasing Power Parity method) -- not counting 
the several rich countries with less than one million people (World Bank 2000b).  
2 Earlier literature surveys can be found in Corden (1968) for writings up to the mid-1960s and, for the 
next decade, in Gruen (1978; 1983) and especially Lloyd (1978), Edwards and Watson (1978), and 
Smith (1983).  
3 In fact the increased demand for nontradables (and other products) would begin as soon as 
expectations about future income prospects rose, which could be well before the mining export boom 
shows up in the trade statistics in the case where the exports are preceded by FDI inflows for 
investments with a long lead time (Corden 1982). 
4 Gregory (1976) was the first to focus on the mining boom issue from an Australian perspective 
following the 1973-74 hikes in international energy prices. His analysis was refined by Snape (1977). 
Corden (1984) placed those Australian writings in the context of the global booming-sector literature 
and provides a consolidated theory of the effects of such booms on the intersectoral distribution of 
production (including nontradables) and of trade. 
5 In earlier Australian initiatives to form regional/preferential trading arrangements, economic analyses 
were more qualitative. Examples are the bilateral Closer Economic Relations with New Zealand (Lloyd 
1991) and a proposed free trade area with the United States (Snape 1989; Snape, Adams and Morgan 
1993). 
6 See, for example, the conference proceedings volume edited by Grubel and Johnson (1971). 
7 ERAs have been estimated for all Australian manufacturing industries at the 2-, 3- and 4-digit levels 
of disaggregation each year since 1968-69, for all rural industries since 1970-71, and occasionally also 
for mining industries (whose ERAs are close to or below zero). Details can be freely downloaded from 
the website of Australia’s Productivity Commission at www.pc.gov.au. The Commission also estimates 
and publishes the consumer tax equivalent of industry assistance policy measures including the tariff. 
The availability of such comprehensive estimates of ERAs has made it easier to use the economics of 
politics to explain the intra-sectoral pattern of assistance to industries, as in Anderson (1980). 
8 That transparency agency had an increasingly influential role within the government and in the wider 
community from the late 1960 until the 1980s (Glezer 1982, Warhurst 1982, Rattigan 1986), and it 
remains very influential today through publishing rational economic analyses on an ever-wider range of 
microeconomic policy issues. 
9  This was still higher than for other OECD countries in the late 1990s though: New Zealand 3.4 per 
cent, European Union 3.2 per cent, Canada 2.9 per cent, United States 2.4 per cent, Japan 2.0 per cent 
(World Bank 2000a, Table 6.6). And WTO-bound tariffs average more than twice the applied rates 
(Productivity Commission 2000a, Table 2.3). However, Australia uses non-tariff import barriers less 
frequently than other OECD countries, apart perhaps from anti-dumping duties (Productivity 
Commission 2000a, Table 5.2 and 2000c, pp. 38-44). 
10 Tariffs on motor vehicle imports fell from 40 to 15 per cent over the 1990s and are due to fall to 10 
per cent in 2005; for clothing the decline over the 1990s was from 55 to 25 per cent, and for footwear 
from 45 to 15 per cent (with falls to 17.5 and 10 per cent due by 2005, respectively – Productivity 
Commission 2000a, Table 4.4). 
11 Tobacco also was highly assisted, but deregulation of tobacco marketing arrangements began in 1995 
and was completed in 2000, bringing effective assistance to tobacco growing down from 30 to 2 per 
cent over that period. As from 1 July 2000, the remaining impediments to a free domestic market in 
fluid milk began to be dismantled, for which compensation to dairy farmers is to be paid over the next 
eight years (as provided also to tobacco producers in the late 1990s). 
12 For an early assessment see Forsyth (1992), while an update on the 1990s is in Forsyth (2000). All 
Productivity Commission reports on the myriad reforms are downloadable at www.pc.gov.au. Recent 
research on barriers to trade in a wide range of services in almost 40 countries found that services 
markets in Australia, relative to those in the other countries in the study, are now ranked as either very 
liberal (banking, distribution services, telecoms, engineering professional services) or just moderately 
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